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Forum des Doctorants Conditions de viabilité des flottilles de pêche et systèmes de gestion par quotas; application au cas la Sole du golfe de Gascogne.

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Présentation au sujet: "Forum des Doctorants Conditions de viabilité des flottilles de pêche et systèmes de gestion par quotas; application au cas la Sole du golfe de Gascogne."— Transcription de la présentation:

1 Forum des Doctorants Conditions de viabilité des flottilles de pêche et systèmes de gestion par quotas; application au cas la Sole du golfe de Gascogne Superviseur: Olivier Guyader Zidane Larabi 25/10/ DPMA PPDR

2 Surexploitation des ressources halieutiques et des écosystèmes à léchelle mondiale et européenne Ressource commune course au poisson Surcapacités de pêche 2 Enjeux - contexte Fonctions Aménagement des pêcheries: Mesures de conservation (TAC) insuffisantes pour régler le problème de surexploitation des pêcheries Boncoeur et al. 2006

3 3 Réforme de la PCP Proposition de mise en place dun système de quotas individuels transférables (QIT) « concessions de pêche transférables » à léchelle européenne (Livre vert 2009 Com de juillet 2011) QIT : outil permettant de diminuer les surcapacités Autonomie financière: fin des sorties de flottes aidées Accroitre les revenus de la pêche sur la base des expériences internationales de QIT (Danemark, Pays Bas, Norvège, Islande, Australie, Nouvelle Zélande) Autres propositions de la commission: Bannir les rejets en mer: décompté des quotas Garde-fous: éviter la concentration des droits/ protection Small Scale Autogestion: Accroissement du rôle des OP en Europe Objectif : Durabilité des pêcheries et atteindre le RMD en 2015 différents scénarios proposés dans limpact Assessment

4 Problématique La forme de gestion permettant de satisfaire des conditions de viabilité des flottilles de pêche dans un système de droits à produire? 4

5 Quota management in France: Adaptation of the french actors to non transferability of fishing rights. 5 Partie 1

6 Olympic National quotas Blue Europe: EU TACs – First allocation of quotas by regions and POs for 6 species (track records or negotiation) Law on fisheries and aquaculture Official allocation of quotas to POs (sliding track records + social- eco criteria) 2010 Modernization Law on agriculture and fisheries 2008 & Test on Individual catch limit scheme for some species Track record per owner based on fix average catches 2006 Order on distribution and collective management of fishing opportunities Increasing role of POs Vessel quotas Common patrimonial & non transferability of fishing rights 1990 Decree-law Order N° Order on individual Catch limit Individual catch limit scheme for some species Evolution of quota management system

7 TACs French quotas PO Non PO Producer Sub -quota by PO/Non PO Producer Collective Management of sub quota by PO > 70% during at least one of three previous years MS share based on fixe relative stability key Quota share by PO/Non PO based on track record of vessel-producer MS Catches/Landings Sharing and Management of French quotas

8 How actors behave within a non transferability context ? 8 1. Producers 2. POs 3. Member State

9 9 No transferabilty of quotas between producers Possibility to transfer vessel track records subject to an administrative agreement between owners (buyer and seller) validated by their PO PRODUCER ADAPTATION 1. Producers behaviour and vessel quotas Average of landings for the years 2001,2002,2003) Producer =Owner= track record (Average of landings for the years 2001,2002,2003) Track records of a PO member in Kg

10 10 Possibility to scrap their vessels according to decommissioning schemes and keep quotas if stay in fleet 2.Other adaptations to non transferability « New entrants may benefit from inactif track record allocation via National Reserve » Rules of track record allocation in case of decommissioning schemes PONon PO 100%of trackrecords to PO ActiveProducer 100%of trackrecords to Non PO 50%oftrack record to PO __________ 50%oftrack record to national reserve 100 %of trackrecord to national reserve PONon PO Non active Producer

11 11 Evolution of the number of vessels and % of small scale vessels (less than 12m) in POs Voluntary agreement Increasing number of vessels in POs (+ 30% between 2000 and 2007) Growing number of small scale vessels (50% in 2000, 60% in 2010) 3. Producers and involvement in POs DATA SOURCE:DPMA

12 12 The merge of 2 POs in 2011:PROMA+FROM BRETAGNE ARPEVIE/SOCOSAMA= OP VENDEE PMA+OPOB=2011 FROM S-O+LA COTINIERE? POs concentration in the future, 4-5 PO ? POs headquarters – 19 POs (COM n°104/2000) 2. POs structure and evolution SOURCE:DPMA

13 1. Pos management Receive and Manage producers quotas 13 sole maquereau cabillaud baudroie, lieu noir

14 total exchanges of quotas between French POs in tons North South Donor Receiver 2. Other adaptation: Exchange of collective quotas only between POs Cod equivalent+ Price in auction Supply/Demand(negociation) Stock contrainst - PO consuming or not entire quota -PO exchange to maximize production Around 4% of the quotas (value and quantity ) are exchanged between Pos DATA SOURCE:DPMA

15 15 Supply of French quotas to other MS( ) Demand of quotas from other EU MS( ) Community exchanges represents around 26% of the total French quotas in volume ( and 12 % value) over the recent years. 3. Exchange of quotas between Member States Cod equivalent+ Price in auction Supply/Demand(negociation) Period of year=Quota rush Stock contrainst

16 16 Conclusion Collective quota system Adaptation to non transferabilty

17 Quels sont les facteurs explicatifs de ladhésion des producteurs au sein des OP? Collaboration avec CSIRO Australie Partie 2 17

18 14 Atlantic producer organisations representing a important number of producer vessels in French Atlantic fisheries both in volume and value. POs are set up by fishermen who voluntarily form a CLUB: -to ensure optimum conditions for the marketing -management of collective their fishing rights. Une OP = Organisation intermédiaire et décentralisée de responsabilité collective Initial investigations suggest : - Operators of larger vessels enter producer organisations to benefit from the market stabilization resulting from the withdrawal price mechanism. -Operators of smaller vessels have been historically operated outside the producer organisation system. -Due to regulatory changes, the relevance of producer organisations has increased with respect to quota management impact on the behaviour of operators of smaller vessels. Producer organisations 18

19 Choice PONon PO PO1POn PO2 Econometric Model A nested logit model : analyze the factors that explain the vessel owners decision to join or not producer organisations. We test the assumption that an operator will choose to join the producer organisation that best satisfies their preference set in terms of management services offered Explanatory Variables: Vessel size, Vessel age, Fee membership rates, PO size, Total of quotas for each PO, Number of fishery closures, Producer lives in the same geographic region as the Pos… incorporate network variables indicative of the relationship and connections among producer organisations using five years of quota exchanges among French Atlantic producer organisations 19

20 total exchanges of quotas between French POs in tons North South Donor Receiver Cod equivalent+ Price in auction Supply/Demand(negociation) Stock contrainst - PO consuming or not entire quota -PO exchange to maximize production Around 4% of the quotas (value and quantity ) are exchanged between Pos DATA SOURCE:DPMA

21 Conditions of mutualized management of fishing rights by PO across the different scenarios of allocation: The case of mixed fisheries in the Bay of Biscay Partie 3 21

22 Species Theorical individual quotas kg Production kg Anglerfish VII Cod VIIb/k Cod VIIa 270 Haddock VII Nephrops VII Saithe VII 222 Ling VI, VII, VIII Whiting VII b/k Whiting VIIa 8 Hake VII Forkbeard VI Plaice VII fg Sole VIIe Sole VIIf,g 608 Sole VII h,j,k 105 TOTAL Comparison between individual quota based on Track records and production of a PO member in Kg Mutualisation The collective management approach allows to producer opportunity to adjust their production independent of the personal track record. It permits to allocate quotas to producer in disconnecting track record of members to approach the reality of the producer strategy or behaviour and take into account the dependence on species. Collective management allows certain fishermen without track record =mutualisation can maintain all members active 22 Collective

23 Develop Bioeconomic Model with scenario: PO allocation and management in mixed fisheries in the Bay of Biscay Viability, control, discard, compliance, sanction…. 23 Bioeconomic Model

24 Doyen, L., & Béné, C Sustainability of fisheries through marine reserves: a robust modeling analysis. J. of Environmental Management, 69, 1–13. Clark, C. (2006). The worldwide crisis in fisheries: economic models and human behavior, Cambridge University Press. Guyader, O. (2002). "Simulating the Effect of Regulatory Systems in a Fishery, An Application to the French Driftnet Albacore Fleet." Environmental and Resource Economics 23(1): Little, L., A. Punt, et al. (2009). "An agent-based model for simulating trading of multi-species fisheries quota." Ecological Modelling 220(23): Marchal,P et al(2009) A comparative review of the fisheries resource management systems in New Zealand and in the European Union Marchal,P et al (2011) Quota allocation in mixed fisheries: a bioeconomic modellingapproach applied to the Channel flatfish fisheries Références bibliographiques 24

25 Merci à vous 25


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