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1 Why is competition relevant for Africa? Frederic Jenny Cour de cassation, France Professor of Economics, ESSEC Strenghtening Constituencies for Effective.

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Présentation au sujet: "1 Why is competition relevant for Africa? Frederic Jenny Cour de cassation, France Professor of Economics, ESSEC Strenghtening Constituencies for Effective."— Transcription de la présentation:

1 1 Why is competition relevant for Africa? Frederic Jenny Cour de cassation, France Professor of Economics, ESSEC Strenghtening Constituencies for Effective Competition Regimes in Select West African Countries (CUTS 7Up4 Project) Accra, Ghana, Thursday June 19th 2008

2 2 Issues to be covered 1)What is required to make competition work ? ( ex Fuel distribution and Telecoms in Nigeria, Construction industry in Senegal) 2) The effect of anticompetitive practices - Anticompetitive practices and consumer welfare ( Cement in Nigeria, Mobile telephony in Ghana) - Anticompetive practices and the productivity of industry ( Insurance in Nigeria, West African Shipping) - Anticompetitive practices, farmers, and agricultural markets ( Potato in Rwanda, Rice market in Burkina Faso, Fertilizers in West Africa) 3) The role of multinational firms in anticompetitive practices ( Bolloré in Ivory Coast, and Castel in the West Africa ) 4) Does competition displace local firms to the detriment of multinational firm? (Oil service providers in Nigeria, Electricity in Senegal) 5) Does competition scare away valuable foreign direct investtment ? Conclusion

3 3 1)What is required to make competition work ? ( ex Fuel distribution and Telecoms in Nigeria, Construction industry in Senegal)

4 4 What is required to make competition work Physical Infrastructures Trade liberalization Domestic and international Appropriate Market Structures ( ind policy, Merger control) Appropriate Incentives (Privatization good governance) Sectoral regulations and appropriate regulatory structure Good set of laws (Commercial, Bankrupcy Property Market Institutions Competition or antitrust laws and authority An integrated approach to market reform

5 5 Privatisation and competition: the case of telecoms in Nigeria One major reason people are uncomfortable with privatisation is because they feel insecure with capitalism. Capitalism, which is privatisation's forebear, has never exactly been popular. This is because it is based on harsh and unpleasant sounding concepts like "return on investment," "profits," and "market forces". People think that when government companies are privatised, their services become expensive in service of shareholders profits and government officials counter by saying that the cost of some of these services may actually go down. But we all know that only increased competition and a depression in demand can force down prices. So why don't we increase competition as we privatise? If NITEL is privatised for instance and there is only one additional national carrier as in the just licensed Globalcom in our own case, the services of NITEL may improve in response to the slight increase in competition, but the whole thing may end up becoming a cartel of two companies as we currently have with GSM operations in Nigeria. As it is now, GSM tariffs are a swindle partly because there are only three GSM operators for a population of over 100 million Nigerians. There are no reasons why the government should not license say 10 operators for a nation the size of Nigeria so that the full benefits of the so-called liberalisation would be appropriated. Sam Nda-Isaiah,Daily Trust Sep 09, 2002 (All Africa Global Media via COMTEX)

6 6 Deregulation of the fuel distribution in Nigeria Chairman of the PETROLEUM Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), Chief Rasheed Gbadamosi, claimed that deregulation of the downstream oil industry together with the vexed issue of pricing, had come to stay. Expressing conviction that marketers have adequate capacity to satisfy domestic fuel demand, Chief Gbadamosi hailed deregulation, saying it would perfect a congenial business environment for them to invest in the downstream petroleum market. He said the local refineries collapsed because subsidised fuel prices could not generate enough fund for their maintenance, adding that price regulation has also made it difficult for licencees for local refineries to embark on the project. Stressing that deregulation was irreversible, he said the agency would "continue on monitoring and verification exercise," adding "I don't deal with prices any more, it is a deregulated thing." Speaking for the marketers, the Managing Director of Unipetrol Nigeria Plc, Mr. Jubril Tinubu, said the challenge on the marketers under the new regime was to satisfy domestic demand, invest in facilities and explore local refining of products. He allayed fears of evolution of a cartel of marketers in the system, explaining that the sheer number of marketers made the idea absurd. Lagos, 15 October 2003 Distributed via COMTEX News.

7 7 Sénégal: Infrastructures - Le secteur BTP inventorie les difficultés, (Dakar),le 5 Juin 2008 Le Syndicat national des entreprises de bâtiments et travaux publics (Snbtp) a organisé une après-midi de réflexion sur le thème « Politique des infrastructures au Sénégal : état des lieux et perspectives ». Ils ont dressé un inventaire approfondi sur les difficultés rencontrées dans la réalisation des infrastructures au Sénégal. Il s'agit: de l'absence d'un code de la construction et d'un système de normalisation dynamique et performant', a relevé M. Abd'El Kader Ndiaye (…) des faiblesses majeures dans l'élaboration des cahiers de charges parfois incomplets et inadaptés (…) la sélection restrictive des entreprises nationales (…) et la non-transparence dans l'attribution et la gestion des marchés publics. A ce niveau, il a salué les efforts accomplis avec l'avènement du nouveau code des marchés publics dont la bonne application reste cependant le défi majeur pour tous les acteurs. sions, de trésorerie, de la qualité des infrastructures sont autant de préoccupations soulevées et partagées par les autres acteurs présents à la rencontre.

8 8 2) The effect of anticompetitive practices

9 9 Competition and development In all countries, lack of competition results in two types of abuses: -Exclusionary practices such as refusal to give access to essential facilities, tying, predatory pricing ( thus depriving potential competitors from legitimate economic opportunities) -Exploitative practices such as abusively high prices, price fixing, tying, lower quality/price ratios ( thus depriving consumers from the benefits of competition) Developing countries are often the victims of such practices: -Because of the high level of concentration in some sectors (due to the small size of the economy); -Because of the small size of the business community and lack of inventive to compete domestically; - Because they are exposed to transnational anticompetitive practices -Because, often they do not have a competition law to sanction abusive practices or lack enforcement means.

10 10 - Anticompetitive practices and consumer welfare ( Cement in Nigeria, Mobile telephony in Ghana)

11 11 Sectors Subject to Anticompetive Practices which Affect the Welfare of Consumers Many anticompetitive practices are alleged in sectors sheltered from international competition in developing countries such as: Local agriculture and local fishing Local telephony Construction Electricity Water Bus and rail transportation ( Matutu, taxis, buses) Local wholesale and retail trade Real estate Services ( lawyers etc…)

12 12 The Federal Government has reinstated its determination to bring down the increasing price of cement in spite of the recent desperate moves by a cartel to frustrate its efforts. A top government official told LEADERSHIP last night that "the move is in the interest of the common citizens." Recently, the government, through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, selected five companies – Minaj, BUA, Madewell, Lababibi and Regan – to import the cement in 50kg bags with the sole purpose of flooding the market and consequently reducing the cost of the product and, through this, democratise home ownership in the country. Nigeria: FG Set to Crash Cement Price LeadershipLeadership (Abuja),13 June 2008

13 13 Nigeria: FG Set to Crash Cement Price Leadership (Abuja),13 June 2008 Leadership However, LEADERSHIP gathered that some monopolists, led by the Chairman/Managing Director of the Flour Mill Limited, Mr. George Coumantarous, is working assiduously to frustrate the efforts of the government. "It is interesting to note the hysteria trailing the decision of the Federal Government to bring down the prices of cement," a stakeholder who doesn't want his name mentioned in print for fear of backlash from Coumantarous told our correspondent last night. "The sole purpose of the government is to reduce the cost of the product and, through this, democratise home ownership in Nigeria; this is the first time a government in Nigeria has been motivated by the courage of its conviction and stand by the citizens of the country with a determination to relieve them of their misery, which has been forced on them by a few businessmen.

14 14 "The groups have formed themselves into a cartel that had monopolised essential products in the country, and in their greed they have being exploiting the honest Nigerian workers to fund their insatiable pleasure and love for private jets and the latest state of the art yachts and automobiles. The products are cement, salt, flour, sugar and oil." LEADERSHIP gathered that although Mr. Coumantarous, who has been in the country for nearly two decades, is the chief executive officer of a flour mill, he is hugely involved in the present monopoly of cement in the country for selfish business interest. Most stakeholders who spoke to our correspondent expressed serious concern over a false sense of exclusivity that all successive governments in the nation would be doing their biddings. Nigeria: FG Set to Crash Cement Price Leadership (Abuja),13 June 2008 Leadership

15 15 LEADERSHIP investigations revealed that at a time a 50kg bag of cement is being sold in the country for N2, 000 the same product costs N600 in a neighbouring country, Benin Republic, while the same product sells for N612 in Lebanon. In Cairo, it is $5, Greece $5.50 and Syria $7. While the cartel may have continued to make huge issues out of the Federal Government's moves to crash the price of cement, a stakeholder said, "It is unfair to the economy of the nation and the general welfare of its citizens for the cartel, which never had a single investment in the cement industries until about three years ago and had been receiving licences, tax and duty port concessions to import cement, including bags, for about 20 years to now insist on having a cement factory as a pre-condition for the issuance of licence in the current dispensation. "There is also no moral justification for this group of people to preside over who is and who is not given the import license as they will not be fair in their selection. The law of self-preservation would naturally make them to try to preserve their exclusive club." Nigeria: FG Set to Crash Cement Price Leadership (Abuja),13 June 2008 Leadership

16 16 " The questionable actions of this cartel had depressed investment in the sub- sector for a long time (…), they used their political clout, generated by their financial contributions to sustain their greed," an insider in the operational activities of the cement cartel said. "The days of monopoly are over as President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua is ready to open the economic space and allow for the introduction of new ideas and ways of moving the economy forward," our source added. Wondering why it took the "bold step" by Yar'Adua to ensure availability of cement at reasonable price in the country before the cartel started indicating how it could use its magic wand to provide cement at cheaper prices, our source said what the monopolists are doing is inimical to the nation, especially the "long-suffering Nigerians." Nigeria: FG Set to Crash Cement Price Leadership (Abuja),13 June 2008 Leadership

17 17 The National Communication Authority (NCA) will soon announce a sixth mobile phone network operator in the mobile telephony sector as part of efforts to deepen the telecom sector. The NCA says its decision to issue a license to a sixth mobile operator is in pursuance of the Authority's policy of assuring vibrant competition, accelerated attainment of universal access, market order and diversity of product as well as service offerings at competitive and affordable prices. Business and Financial TimesBusiness and Financial Times. Accra, June A sixth mobile phone network operator in Ghana

18 18 - Anticompetive practices and the productivity of industry ( Insurance in Nigeria, Shipping in West Africa)

19 19 Anticompetitive practices impairing economic development Fertilizers : input for agriculture Oil : input for agriculture and manufacturing Construction and construction materials : input for manufacturing Transportation : input for all production activites Telecommunications input for all production activities Banking and financial services: input for all production activities Wholesale trade Steel, heavy electrical equipment, aluminium etc……. At the domestic level At the international level

20 20 Price cartel in the insurance industry in Nigeria ? Brokers Still Oppose Blanket Rate Hikes. Still basking in the euphoria of its new charter status, a legal document which has altered its name, the Nigerian Council of Registered Insurance Brokers (NCRIB) last week took a swipe at the Nigerian Insurers Association (NIA) induced price overhaul insisting that rates must be determined by individual risks profile. Consequently, the NCRIB said that the NIA directive for across the board rate increase was not only unscientific but intended to create cartel. It contended that every form of increase in rates must not only be gradual but must reflect individual client's risk exposure and loss ratio. Lagos, Sep 02, 2003 (Daily Champion/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX News)

21 21 Hike in shipping tariffs worries African Council Libreville, Gabon (PANA) March 2, The Union of African Shippers Council is opposed to increase in tariffs for North-South shipping services that goes into effect 1 March 2004, arguing that the measure penalises its members and the economies of the region. The Europe-West Africa Trade Agreement (EWATA) (EWAC) conference had agreed to increase freight rates, and shipping agencies that are members of the cartel are required to implement the decision. Prominent among the shipping lines are Delmas, Maersk Sealand, Nlle Dutch Africa Line, OT Africa Line, P&O Nedlloyd, Safmarine and West Afrika Linien Dienste. But the African Shippers Council vice president, Roland Meza Kangatima of Congo, said here at the weekend that the Council was "once again concerned about these increases which undoubtedly penalise our shippers and the economies of the sub-region. » He stressed the need for contacts with the EWATA to examine a framework of cooperation on issues relative to freight and servicing African seaports. Authorities here insist that a rise in the shipping rates would have an attendant increase the price of goods and shipping related services.

22 22 - Anticompetitive practices, farmers, and agricultural markets ( Potato in Rwanda, Rice in Niger and Burkina Faso, Fertilizers in West Africa)

23 23 Pénurie de pommes de terre au Rwanda La pomme de terre se fait rare sur les marchés rwandais. Estimant qu'ils n'y gagnent rien, les producteurs du Nord ont, en effet, renoncé en masse à cette culture. Daprès un revendeur, ce serait une façon pour eux de "gréver contre la CECMA (coopérative des fournisseurs de pommes de terre du Nord-Ouest, Ndlr " qui dispose du monopole dachat et de revente de toute la production du Nord et du Nord-Ouest. La Coopérative, qui approvisionne les autres régions du pays, paye les agriculteurs 50 Frw (0,10 $) le kilo et se charge de les revendre à près de 60 Frw. Elle assure l'écoulement de la production, auparavant difficile pour certains producteurs. Mais, pour nombre de villageois, la CECMA fixe les prix unilatéralement sans tenir compte des coûts engagés par les agriculteurs. "Le prix donné au producteur reste inchangé depuis quatre ans", affirme un villageois de Nyabihu, ex-Gisenyi. "Ce revenu ne fait que décourager les producteurs vu ce quils investissent dans cette culture", remarque un membre d'Abadahemuka.

24 24 Létroitesse des marchés ouest africains favorise lapparition doligopoles ou dententes entre opérateurs. On trouve ces formes de coordination dans tous les secteurs industriels et commerçants auxquels les agriculteurs font face. Ces derniers sont alors en position de dominés dans leur capacité de négociation. Nous pouvons lillustrer dans le cas du marché du riz et des engrais. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008

25 25 Au Niger deux importateurs jouent un rôle déterminant dans le fonctionnement du marché du riz. Ils exercent un contrôle sur La plupart des circuits de distribution et les variations de leurs stocks influence celle des prix. Les grossistes seraient au nombre dune trentaine dont la plupart sont établis à Niamey. Une analyse des marges brutes de commercialisation montre quelles sont relativement stables, indépendamment des fluctuations du coût de revient du riz importé. On aurait donc superposition de deux stratégies: celle des importateurs en position doligopole, qui maintiennent des marges élevées, permise par un niveau de productivité du riz local faible, et celle des grossistes, en plus grand nombre, mais qui manifestement arrivent à sentendre pour maintenir leur niveau de marge quel que soient les prix dapprovisionnement. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008

26 26 Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008: Le riz au Burkina Faso Au Burkina Fasso, la position dominante traditionnelle de la Caisse générale de péréquation (CGP) qui avait le monopole dimportation jusquen 1996 a été prolongée par des barrières à lentrée de nouveaux importateurs: les volumes minimum dimportation furent imposés à 1000 tonnes, deux tests de qualité étaient nécessaires pour lobtention dun certificat phytosanitaire avec un coût de 1500 Fcfa/T dont la couverture nécessite des volumes importants et qui induisaient des délais importants pour qui ne maitrise pas les rouages administratifs. Il a fallu attendre une conjoncture favorable de baisse des prix mondiaux au début de 1997 pour que quelques privés investissent le marché en profitant de coûts dexploitation plus faibles que la CGP.

27 27 Par la suite, avec le retour à la normale des prix,ces commerçants ont du sentendre pour maintenir leur avantage et ne pas baisser leurs prix de vente alors que les prix mondiaux baissaient. Lobjectif affiché de la libéralisation qui était linstauration de la concurrence et lajustement des prix na pas produit le résultat attendu. Un oligopole se maintient alors favorisé par des barrières à lentrée et les avantages dont jouissait la CGP de la part du gouvernement pour assurer, dans les meilleures conditions sa privatisation. Les principaux privés, dorénavant seuls acteurs parvinrent à contrôler les grossistes des centres urbains en leur accordant crédit et participation dans leurs autres activités.. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008: Le riz au Burkina Faso

28 28 Cest par la suite lensemble des circuits de distribution du riz qui furent ainsi pilotés. Ce fonctionnement imposait le traitement de volume importants et une surface financière conséquente pour pouvoir être compétitifs. Ceci excluait de fait les petits et moyens opérateurs du marché du riz qui nont, de surcroit, généralement pas accès au crédit bancaire. Ces modes de coordination non concurrentiels expliquent la stabilité des prix à la consommation et sa déconnexion par rapport à linstabilité des prix internationaux et des prix caf obtenus par les différents opérateurs. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008: Le riz au Burkina Faso

29 29 Le marché des engrais pour sa part est dominé par deux sociétés filiales de multinationales (Yara ex Hydro-Agri, Norvège et STEPC SSI ex Mines des Potasses dAlsace). La première est présente au Bénin, au Cameroun en Cote dIvoire et en Afrique Australe et la seconde au Cameroun, au Mali, en Côte dIvoire, au Burkina Faso et au Senégal. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008: Le marché des engrais en Afrique de lOuest

30 30 De 1999 à 2006 la seule usine productrice durée en Afrique de lOuest avait fermé ses portes. Le marché se partageait ainsi entre les trois compagnies régionales, les deux citées précédemment et la SENCHIM, entreprise sénégalaise. Régulièrement la presse fait état de contrats « paradoxaux » ou les prix pratiqués ne correspondent pas aux prix de marché avec des insinuations sur le financement des partis politiques. Par exemple au Bénin en 2005/2006 toutes les sociétés de distribution ont proposé le même prix. Améliorer le fonctionnement des marchés en Afrique de lOuest Février 2008: Le marché des engrais en Afrique de lOuest

31 31 3) The role of multinational firms in anticompetitive practices ( Bolloré in Ivory Coast, and Castel in West Africa)

32 32 Ivory Coast Mamadou Koulibaly (…) President of the Ivory Coast National Assembly, economist,(…) has worked in Dakar alongside the most well know academics of French speaking Africa (…) In May 2003, he wrote the preface of a political tract: « The French War Against the Ivory Coast ». « France is said to have activated the rebels, in reality « puppets », to protect her « monopoly interests » in her most prominent former colony in West Africa. He speaks of (…) the « monopoly situation » of French companies in the Ivory Coast and cites the « privatization » of Ivory Coast Telecom, bought on the cheap, according to him- by a foreign public utility, France Telecom, or of the third bridge of the Abidjan Lagoon that Bouygues was to build before « proposing a metal bridge instead of a concrete one, that was 40 % more expensive » ». Le Monde Friday 19 November 2004

33 33 FRANCE'S BOLLORE GRANTED NO-BID CONTRACT FOR IVORY COAST CONTAINER PORT (I) French company Bollore has won a 15-year renewable contract to manage the container facility at Ivory Coast's main seaport of Abidjan, officials said here Friday. Bollore won the no-bid contract with a pledge to manage the Vridi Container Port (TCV) facility for 5.5 billion CFA francs (10.4 million dollars / 8.4 million euros) through its management subsidiary, and to invest 23 billion CFA francs in the seaport. Abidjan port in its halycon days was one of the biggest and busiest in west Africa. It is located in the economic heart of Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer and regarded as a haven of peace and stability in the troubled region until the country's first coup in December (…). Friday, 30 January 2004, Agence France Presse

34 34 FRANCE'S BOLLORE GRANTED NO-BID CONTRACT FOR IVORY COAST CONTAINER PORT (II) The port used to serve as a lifeline for several landlocked countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger which transported 60 percent of their traffic -- roughly 600,000 tonnes from Abidjan by rail. Bollore also manages the rail links between Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, which were severed after the start of the Ivorian crisis in September 2002, further affecting business at the port. The French company is also a key player in the processing and export of key commodities -- including cotton, coffee and cocoa, of which Ivory Coast is the world's largest producer. Friday, 30 January 2004, Agence France Presse

35 35 FRANCE'S BOLLORE GRANTED NO-BID CONTRACT FOR IVORY COAST CONTAINER PORT III (…) The no-bid contract has come under fire in Ivory Coast. Jean- Louis Billon, head of the Ivory Coast Chamber of Commerce (CCCI), complained that the contract was awarded "in total opacity –- we were neither associated nor involved. "It is anti-economic to grant the management concession for the container port to a single operator who is involved in maritime, maintenance, rail transport operations... You might as well give the whole transport sector for the country to one man and be done with it," he said. "There were other companies that made proposals that were much more positive for the port and for the Ivorian economy," added Billon. Friday, 30 January 2004, Agence France Presse

36 36 La stratégie du groupe Bolloré et le pouvoir de marché Audition de Monsieur Vincent Bolloré par une Commission denquête de lAssemblée Nationale, Paris le 31 mars 1999 « La deuxième particularité (du groupe Bolloré) cest que jai souhaité le diversifier (…). La particularité de cette diversification, cest que nous sommes allés et nous nallons que vers des métiers dans lesquels nous pensons pouvoir occuper une position forte ». « Nous sommes aujourdhui, à la suite dun certain nombre dopérations de croissance externe et interne, le premier groupe dans le transport nord-sud qui constitue une niche très spécifique (…). Sil veut être efficace, le transporteur doit offrir à ses clients ce que lon appelle un service porte à porte(…) ».

37 37 Lacquisition du pouvoir de marché par le groupe Bolloré Audition de Monsieur Vincent Bolloré par une Commission denquête de lAssemblée Nationale, Paris le 31 mars 1999 « Jai racheté la SCAC en 1986 parce quelle avait été créée par ma belle famille, les Fossorier. (…) Peu après le rachat, en juin 1986, Tristan Vieljeux, qui était aussi candidat ma demandé de lui revendre cette entreprise. (…) Jai évidemment refusé.(…) Un combat a alors commencé: il possédait les bateaux et nous les marchandises et il a refusé de transporter nos marchandises sur ses bateaux ce qui nétait pas commode parce que le secteur maritime français était à lépoque protégé par une sorte de monopole (deux groupes détenaient à parité 80% du trafic). Nous avons finalement acheté Delmas ( en 1991) pour mettre fin à ce conflit ».

38 38 Lattrait du monopole pour le groupe Bolloré « Le personnel de Delmas avait lhabitude de voir la société augmenter ses tarifs pour résoudre ses difficultés: cela ne posait aucun problème en situation de monopole, les clients ne pouvaient que sy plier ». Audition de Monsieur Vincent Bolloré par une Commission denquête de lAssemblée Nationale, Paris le 31 mars 1999 Audition de Monsieur Yvon Le Bihan, délégué syndical CFTC de Bolloré par une Commission denquête de lAssemblée Nationale, Paris le 31 mars 1999 « Aujoudhui la chance de Mr Vincent Bolloré est de disposer du monopole de la manutention en Afrique. Mais pour combien de temps? Avec larrivée de Maersk dans ce secteur, (le monopole) risque de disparaître dans trois à quatre ans; Que se passera-t-il alors ?

39 39 Les vicissitudes de la concurrence pour le groupe Bolloré « (Depuis lacquisition de Delmas) nous avons fortement développé cette entreprise. Nous y avons consacré du temps et beaucoup dargent, mais nous y sommes très attachés. (…) Mais elle nous a donné beaucoup de peine parce que, à la fin de 1991, elle était en situation de monopole dont la suppression na été décidée par la Commission de Bruxelles que le 18 février 1992, et a été effective à partir du 1er Avril Lentreprise sest donc retrouvée du jour au lendemain en situation de concurrence ce que nous avons vécu comme « un challenge » très difficile et très couteux ».. Audition de Monsieur Vincent Bolloré par une Commission denquête de lAssemblée Nationale, Paris le 31 mars 1999

40 40 Houblon.net « Portrait de Pierre Castel », Mai 2008 En Angola, Heineken le brasseur néerlandais a jeté léponge pendant la guerre. Castel, lui a repris les installations de Heineken dans ce pays et est toujours là. LAngola lui a également beaucoup rapporté. Au milieu des années 1970, alors que le vin sécoule mal en France, la 33 Export et la Castel Beer coulent à flots dans lancienne colonie portugaise. Les bénéfices aussi. La marge brute de Castel Frères dépasse 50 %. LAfrique est la vache à lait du groupe. Comme un parieur sûr de sa bonne étoile, Pierre Castel réinvestit ses gains. Il multiplie les conquêtes : Cameroun, Togo, Mali, Tchad, Sénégal, Niger, Bénin... Jusquau rachat des Brasseries et Glacières internationales, en 1990, qui scelle définitivement la domination de son groupe en Afrique. Castel devient même lembouteilleur exclusif de Coca-Cola dans une douzaine de pays africains. Cette année, plus de 2 milliards de litres de bières et de sodas sortiront dune de ses unités de production sur ce continent.

41 41 Houblon.net « Portrait de Castel », Mai 2008 Dhomme à homme. Au fil des années, son carnet dadresses sétoffe. Les chefs dEtat africains sont ses « amis ». « Si lon me fait une petite crasse, je les appelle pour quils règlent le problème », dit-il. Comme les importations des commerçants libanais en République centrafricaine. « Jai dit aux autorités : Si vous ne bloquez pas ça, je gèle mes investissements. » Même chose en Côte dIvoire, où le Français exploite lun des principaux complexes sucriers, la Sucaf. Au printemps, il demande à être reçu par Laurent Gbagbo pour faire stopper la contrebande qui sévit aux frontières. Quelques semaines après, le gouvernement ivoirien interdit limportation de sucre pour deux ans ! Explication de la sœur de Castel, Christiane : « Nous sommes des gens de parole. » Traduction de Pierre : « Moi, je nai aucune casserole aux fesses ! »

42 42 4) Does Competition displace local firms to the detriment of multinational firm? (Oil service providers in Nigeria, Electricity in Senegal)

43 43 Competition and the displacement of local firms Economic competition works in favor of economically powerful and rich firms to the detriment of small firms and small economies. This means that the goal of promoting competition at the multilateral level will work against the interest of local firms in developing countries because they are weaker and smaller than firms in developed countries. For example: With the increased opening of the economies, could welfare-creating effects of competition leak out of the economy if new entrants are foreign firms and they displace local incumbents? Because of the smallness of the economy, displacement effects could be widespread and there could be social repercussions. This concern applies within the CSME with respect to the micro-economies, and in the wider context of extra-regional and international trade[1].[1] [1] WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WT/WGTCP/W/143, 2 August 2000, ( ) Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy COMMUNICATION FROM TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

44 44 Price predation by multinational firms in the oil service providers market PETROLEUM Technology Association of Nigeria (PETAN) has accused multinational oil industry service providers of engaging in predatory pricing of contracts in the upstream sector of the nation's oil industry, to the detriment of indigenous service providers. Chairman of PETAN, Chief Obi Ralph Ekezie made the disclosure while speaking with Energy this week in Lagos recently, adding that multinational service providers have also resorted to creating bogus companies to fill the local content requirement. He explained that in order to ensure the demise of local companies who are giving them a run for contracts in the upstream sector, multinational service providers are now willing to absorb loses in new contracts that is up for tender. Chief Ekezie pointed out that the multinational companies do this by under-bidding for contracts to the detriment of local companies, adding that this will ensure that they get the contracts at all cost, even when they are not making any money from the contract. The PETAN chairman pointed out that the multinational service providers have a lot of cash at their disposal and are willing to take loses for as long as four years to ensure that the cancer of local companies go away. Mar 18, 2003 Hector Igbikiowubo (Vanguard/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX)

45 45 Sénégal: Appel d'offre pour le choix du concessionnaire - L'office national d'électricité mieux disant quElectricité de France Wal FadjriWal Fadjri (Dakar) 31 Mai 2008 Pour l'attribution de la première concession d'électrification rurale du Sénégal et qui concerne l'axe Saint-Louis - Dagana - Podor, deux opérateurs privés avaient été qualifiés au terme d'un appel d'offres international. A l'arrivée, c'est l'Office national d'électricité (One) du Maroc qui a raflé la mise au détriment d'Electricité de France (Edf). A première vue, cela peut surprendre qu'une entreprise du Sud gagne un marché de cette envergure au nez et à la barbe d'une entreprise comme Edf, leader mondial dans son domaine. Mais, il n'en est rien. D'après le directeur général de l'Aser, Modibo Diop, c'est au terme d'une procédure transparente que l'One du Maroc a été sélectionné après 'non-objection de la Banque mondiale sur l'évaluation des offres'. Un avis confirmé par Stéphan Garnier, ingénieur spécialiste des questions énergétiques au bureau de la Banque mondiale à Dakar. 'Le seul critère objectif particulier qui a évité toute remise en cause, a été que l'Office national d'électricité s'est engagé à couvrir plus d'abonnés ( abonnés) qu'Edf ( abonnés). Donc, c'est l'entreprise qui propose le plus de clients. A partir de ce moment, on ne pouvait plus rejeter cette offre', explique le fonctionnaire de la Banque mondiale. Selon un dossier de presse remis aux journalistes, l'Office national d'électricité (One) est le numéro un de l'électricité au Maroc.

46 46 5) Does competition scare away valuable foreign direct investment ?

47 47 Foreign direct investors are attracted by profit opportunities -Some profit opportunities are good both for investors and for the economic development of the country. Some profit opportunities are good for investors but not so good for the economic development of the country because the expected profit comes from a commitment by the government to restrict competition in favor of the foreign investor. (examples: Western firms invested heavily in Eastern European countries in the 1990s under the condition that local governments would subsequently prevent other entries in their lines of business).

48 48 The effect of foreign direct investment on competition 1 Foreign Direct Investment can increase competition (particularly in the case of greenfield investments) But Foreign Direct Investment can also reduce competition (and therefore result in a loss for consumers). Therefore Competition law is also necessary to prevent anticompetitive practices or transactions resulting from FDIs. 1) See Unctad Investment Report 2000

49 49 Foreign direct investors are attracted by a business friendly environment An efficient, well-enforced, fair, transparent and predictable legal environment (counter examples Jamaica, Russia, Papua New Guinea). A level playing field and protection against economic abuses by incumbents, whether they are competitors, suppliers, or customers (counter examples Hong Kong).

50 50 Conclusion 1)A large number of reports of anticompetitive practices in Sub-Saharan Africa. 2) Gap between official statements and the perceived reality of anti-competitive practices in Sub-Saharan countries. 3) International trade does not seem to be a strong counterweight to anticompetitive practices in Sub-Saharan Africa ( ex. cement, beer and beverages, air transport). 4) Most of the statements on the lack of importance of competition at the domestic level for Sub-Saharan African countries seem to contradict the reports. 5) The adoption and/or effective enforcement of competition laws by Sub-Saharan countries seems to be a prerequisite for development.

51 51 Thank you


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